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Future of Afghanistan

Series/Special. The next phase leading to the withdrawal of most U.S. forces in Afghanistan. New.




San Francisco, CA, USA

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Channel 91 (627 MHz)






Pakistan 15, U.s. 5, Taliban 4, Afghanistan 3, United States 2, Washington 2, Us 2, Chelation 1, Peron 1, Telxon 1, Brown 1, Kabul 1, Texas 1, South America 1, Poland 1,
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  CSPAN    Future of Afghanistan    Series/Special. The next phase leading to the  
   withdrawal of most U.S. forces in Afghanistan. New.  

    January 13, 2013
    5:30 - 6:00am EST  

talked about in the issues a lot. the regional issues are an important issue. some technical issues such as what kind of agreements will be signed between the united states and afghanistan are important and many others. let me turn to the three speakers each of, will speak between 6-10 minutes. we will open it up to questions and dialogue that. let me start with a gem. >> my responsibilities for afghanistan go back to 2001. i think it is fair to say, at least the current regime in kabul. i start by looking back and try to spot the things we did wrong at the time fundamental errors.
i received at the time and tried to do something which the film to do entirely and did nothing about. >> one was a decision not to deploy any international peacekeepers and enter the country. no police force and no army and we decided security will be an afghan responsibility. i think that was a major mistake. the second was to allow the coalition that we built for the war and peace conference for the bond conference to disintegrate. peron had be helpful. at this don had be actively not unhelpful. we failed to keep up to the standard and to succeed in addition to the years. the third carriage that we've failed to perceive was a failure to perceive for chelation
earlier than we did it. there were a a a certain number of the policy and leadership that was prepared to be all stunned if. that would -- we send them to the guantanamo and negative signal of the those who might consider coopting and being co octave into this system. took as almost addicted to preserve the promise. nevertheless, despite the promise and despite international 10 years of on we are still engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign at into afghanistan, i think we have come a long way then many of us realize. i think some of it is realized in a recent poll just a couple of weeks ago contradiction
between south america a filler high degree of optimism. 52% of the afghans think their country is going and then to the right direction. a 53% of them say they are don't prosperous than they were five years ago. the reasons that they side is better security, more schools, lower reconstruction, that is also interesting to point out the non optimistic side -- worst security as their concern. they are clearly differences cut the introspection. very high. not that high in the communities
of in, but so well over 50%. confidence and then to the afghan national army, 33% and to the poll is, 82%. addenda the government's 75%. those figures compare favorably to comparable polling had been to of the united states. 79% of the other people think of the government is corrupt. it is much as the favor given the posters of the answers they thought they wanted. they were critical of the government. they also seem to have a more balanced approach. the insight the government on balance in their lifetime at the same time they feel it is a very corrupt and something ought to be done about it.
>> more afghans thought the election was -- had been very corrupt and had been very satisfied with the result. so they can hold both concepts that are the media, which seems able to do. we recently did a study assumes to press against any and embarrass perspective. we looked at 20 post conflict read election conflicts, peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts, the biggest fear -- the big enforcement efforts. the monthly smaller u. n ones and a dozen or more other places. we evaluated them on and at the of places.
also, did they approach of the democratization and freedom house chorus to rank them. did they produce of the government, we used indices and they rick every government in the world. did the economy expanded? did did the citizens improved and the nearly use the human development index which looks of both levels of in, but also education and health and other criteria. in democratization, afghanistan did not pass the test. that is definitely a failure. it was about the metal in terms of how much of it was democratized.
but in to a government effectiveness, interestingly, come to distinctive do what we hear about, it right second of the 20 countries. had the second-highest improvement. as but we had the seventh highest, but improved. per capita gdp it was the second highest. it is increased by 130% since 2001. interestingly, human development index it was the highest of all 20. it is a combination of standard of living, education, health, the criteria. i think it is so important to see why afghans ought to be more optimistic about what they should be.
indeed until many cases more optimistic than americans. longevity is way up. literacy is up, but the number of afghan children stay in school for 10 years, afghan literacy rate will be three times higher than today. now, the polls, of course, they did not poll of in some of the areas that were some of the violent the numbers would probably be lower i in some of the areas. the number of areas that we failed up poland were still fairly limited. there was a long story by in of the new york times about how levels cause anxiety. each is written about the cleese the exposed areas and will be
the most exposed to help and. the story is about high levels of anxiety and pessimism. i am not that is not correct, i am responding that is not correct with the attitude of most of the country and as it can be determined. just to end on what we are looking forward two, clearly there are two transitions coming up it. the transition from cars i led the government to somebody else. the two, the latter is the more dangerous, the more difficult, and more uncertain. i did nothing the afghan army as corn to run a way i in 2014, but it is positive that it will result of in a failed transition. i do not mean the election will be a regular, necessarily.
a think a regular election can produce and unstable result. it is 8 two round system. you will have 25 candidates that until the first round and will be more than 10% of the vote. did you will have second round, none of which will have more than 10% of the vote. mathematically what will been but with the constituency of 10% of the country. that kind of results probably will not be enough to help the country to get there. i think the concern about corruption as accurate, real, and a valid, but it is does not meet the. . it is as much corruption as foreign rigid fundamental lessons that hold the country to get there. cars i has booked a downward
that allows him to exert a significant degree of effluents about lines and enter the country. formal institutions of the kind that have been built, not without some success since 2001, but simply are not up since the control and influence. the big question is, can a successor a sam control over the formal restitutions of governments but have a broad and enough patronage effort an effort to replicate the cars i opposes success in this regard it. i think as we tend to evaluate the transition and afghanistan, that is the question we need to be asking ourselves. >> thank you very much. i think that puts a lot of food for thought.
let me turn now and next to a mr. conn. the >> >> you have clarified some of the situations that we are discussing today. for example, and improvement of relationship between u.s. and pakistan on that is better coordination between also there appears to be a better clarity of u.s. positions relating to the very important questions. >> i have offered a few comments that have made mr. my experience.
i do not have any association with them. texas on liked several others have made policy at stakes. pakistan has suffered but it is not all on the ground or in on the floor of many of their contributions to the region. i would also say they cannot place the blame for all of the problems on to others. the first point of a to make here, this is done talk about
credit bet. not as much now. i have not met for several years while i was i in the form office any responsible person from anti civilian leadership who would be seeking to go to afghanistan or who would be considering the taliban as an asset for the future. i am not going to go into details of these as far as the taliban as concerned. there is no question of popular returning to get in why i did
enter the mid 1990's. there are reasons for this. there are to be details. i was the before the moment. there is one thing it. pakistan cannot treat them. this is a point which i think was the demographics and the history and a culture. we will appreciate as much as any pakistan would -- it will remain part of the afghan landscape. here there was a disconnect between the of kasten a position right after 9/11. i think he has made a remark
that it their position is not -- it was not helpful. even at that time, pakistan has argued that reconcilable pakistan should be brought into the floor of the process. that is passed. and this brown there has been a misunderstanding of but say even unfair accusations pakistan has been double dealing etcetera, pakistan could not treat al qaeda -- after two of the night but the american afghanistan where the situation may be
different. i have stated after a period of certain tentativeness today the be cancellation efforts appears to be upon what it ought to be. pacas on and the united states plays a supportive role. pakistan on could be playful and helpful. it's an up be eager because eagerness can very easily be misinterpreted as having its own agenda of try to interfere or support one party or the other. at the same time i would say this should not be unrealistic expectations of pakistan on with the taliban. we can persuade them to do certain things, i would say at
critical times did not accept our point of view. the taliban should be free to talk to anybody who the can abstain in pakistan liked several million other ones. there are not to misuse this hospitality here and to practice don. has to be read into the future. pakistan, i would say, this reported net with each other and i personally believe there is no trip to other packaged on and --
along the threat they face and the commonwealth of the extremist and delicacy. finally, i would have a couple of observations of the u.s. forces withdraw and it before it's too to doesn't work in scenario. the question of u.s. presidents have been discussed, washington at the highest level. but it depends on employment act which is a complement of political card side. and the down side of continue u.s. presence is that we continue to provide in an argument for mullet tends to
justify their -- this is a downside as reluctant to it. there are acutely two arguments with the presence. that it is necessary to keep the army intact and to gather and it is necessary to counter terrorism operations. the army has already shown the ability withstand any attacks from the taliban and what is evident from last year.
it is basically the national army that is effective. no permit can prevent activity -- the pakistan army has not been able to do that. this kind of activities do not lead to the collapse or overthrow of the political systems. one of the transitions that was mentioned, here we have to see the system is collapsed. the system is emplace i
personally do not see any reason why the army should not be able to -- effectively -- after the soviet was able to withstand the forces that were far more organized in that context. it was only after the soviet union collapsed that they fell. this presents a paradox.
what is required by pakistan is to address this challenge to cooperate with each other to realize. that is a was a scenario after two dozen for tank, there are -- there is the conflict need day and quickly. one can hope that the conflict is often time. the upside has a role. it is essentially to help the economy. the construction for
stabilization to the us side players can best contribute by keeping and check -- scrutinizing the concerns the twitter villages. in my view, they can take care of the politics and the security. in these areas, they have confronted areas. thank you. >> thank you very much, ambassador. i think we will get a lot of questions on that. >> it is and honor -- i appreciate the honor. i want to make one point clear. i do not represent the
government or nt 1 in afghanistan. some important points were raised about afghanistan. the major transitions they're going through a macro perspective. we are going through for transitions. we are going to an economic transition, a social transition and a security transition. everyone of these transitions provides its on challenges and opportunities. to the political transitions, which is the upcoming in afghanistan, the good news is he clearly indicated he is not running, an afghan collection put forward a clear timetable for the up coming elections. there is a lot of political activities enter afghanistan. they are talking to each other. the challenge with a political
transition is, we do not have a political system, so we can prepare institutionally and properly for the political transition. the second challenge is, as much as these political leaders are getting together and talking to each other, and nobody is taking a lead to take a clear position on these issues because of the uncertainties regarding afghanistan on one hand. and the other hand, even if he does not want to run for a presidency, he must to have a most important influence. the succession on the outcome and the transition. therefore, i do not think he will endorse any person soon. as soon as he endorses a person, he will become laid-back. people will align themselves before against the person. naturally, he will delay the process of clearly indicating
where he stands on the issue of elections and successes. the other challenges that they are both funded and supervised by the international community. both and monitoring and their funding. there is inside afghanistan, the financial technicality and to run the elections. the second transition is the acknowledgment transition in afghanistan. we are transitioning from a contract economy from a dependency until an economy. the transition is going much better than thought. i am involved in that very for college to a rigid afghanistan. a lot of the company's will make a lot of money working for major
contractors doing construction products and there are shifting into housing and to other areas and to mining. there are adjusting themselves into the reality. they will survive it. there will be adjustment. there is a lot more positive economic activity taking place and afghanistan that makes a lot more hopeful for the afghanistan to be quick. there are still access to capitalist difficulties. they have their challenges. this still have issues with pakistan on, trying to with our treads could be much bigger than it is right now. in much cases, telxon bought but this is but the policies that makes the most difficult. it is it difficult to overcome the challenge because you have
to have a bit of power. the social transition in afghanistan is a new generation of afghans. you can see this. when they used to be travel in afghanistan, of the from plans for, corruption, u.s. military operation. now when they travel, people are complaining about the internet being too slow or it is too expensive. this course has been introduced among young afghans. it is all good news. people are being connected. we see the new generation he burgeon last week, the fund is a for afghanistan which repurchased about 30 students through washington and the white house. when you listen to the kids and when you listen to the kids and what